ENDNOTES for Christian Rights in the Workplace

¹ Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C 2000e et seq. It applies to virtually all employers with fifteen or more employees. For a more detailed explanation of Title VII, see Appendix I.

² Smith v. Pyro Mining, 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. den., 485 U.S. 989 (1988); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993); Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984).

³ Hansard v. Johns-Manville Products, 5 EPD 8543 (E.D. Tex. 1973). Compare Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. McGlothin, 556 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1990), cert. den., 111 S. Ct. 211 (1990) (employee's belief was sincerely held even though she was not an active member of her religious group and wore her head wrap only occasionally).

⁴ Cooper v. General Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. den., 433 U.S. 908 (1977).

⁵ E.E.O.C. v. University of Detroit, 701 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Mich. 1988), rev'd. on other grounds, 904 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1990).

⁶ 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j). The courts and the EEOC have interpreted this provision very liberally. Donald T. Kramer, Validity, Construction, and Application of Provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS 2000e et seq.) and Implementing Regulations, Making Religious Discrimination in Employment Unlawful, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 580, 602 (1975).

⁷ Guidelines On Discrimination Because Of Religion, 29 C.F.R 1605.1.

⁸ Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438-39 (summarizing authorities); see also Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978); 22 A.L.R. Fed. at 601-03.

⁹ EEOC Dec. No. 71-2620 (1970); CCH EEOC Dec. 6823; EEOC Dec. No. 71-779 (1970); CCH EEOC Dec. 6180; EEOC Dec. No. 72-1301 (1972); CCH EEOC Dec. 6338; Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Assoc., 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).

¹⁰ EEOC Dec. No. 79-06 (1978), CCH EEOC Dec. 6737; Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1982).

¹¹ Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439.

¹² Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 654-55(8th Cir. 1995), cert. den., 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996).

¹³See Chalmers v. Tulon Co., 101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996).

¹⁴ Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. den., 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).

¹⁵ Gregory S. Sarno, Harassment or Termination of Employee Due to Religious Beliefs or Practices, 35 P.O.F.2d 209, 222 (1983) (hereinafter "Harassment"); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g and Mfg., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (4th Cir. 1988), cert den., 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).

¹⁶ Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); EEOC v. READS, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1991); 29 C.F.R. 1605.2(c).

¹⁷ Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir. 1972); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1972) (the fact that a particular policy is applied uniformly to all employees does not lessen the discriminatory effect upon a particular employee's religious beliefs).

¹⁸ Brown, 61 F.3d at 652.

¹⁹ Id. at 657 (quoting Burns v. Southern Pacific Transit Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. den., 439 U.S. 1072 (1979)). See also EEOC Dec. 6674 (1976), where an Orthodox Muslim was unlawfully fired for being "overzealous in his practices of his beliefs in his conversation with officers and inmates." The employer fired him because he "cannot be persuaded to tone down his religious practices on the job and continually gets wrapped up in conversations with the inmates." Because there was no evidence that the employee's conduct had made him unable to perform his duties or hampered the efficient operation of the workplace, the employee prevailed in his claim.

²⁰ CCH EEOC Dec. 6338.

²¹ In re: Broadbelt, 146 N.J. 501, 683 A.2d 543 (1996), cert. den., 117 S. Ct. 1251 (1997); See also Hollon v. Pierce, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (California human rights law was not violated by dismissal of school transportation supervisor who had, wholly apart from his employment, produced and distributed a religious tract that led school district to question supervisor's mental stability).

²² Lake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 837 F.2d 449 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. den., 488 U.S. 826 (1988).

²³ Id. at 451. See also E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989) (employer violated Title VII when it made no effort to accommodate two employees' requests to be off on their Sabbaths).

²⁴ Brown v. General Motors, 601 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1979). See also Protos v. Volkswagen of America, 797 F.2d 129 (3rd Cir. 1986) cert. den., 479 U.S. 972.

²⁵ E.E.O.C. v. Universal Mfg., 914 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1990).

²⁶ Pyro Mining, 827 F.2d 1081- 1086.

²⁷ Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979), cert. den., 452 U.S. 939 (1981) reh'g den. 453 U.S. 927 (1981).

²⁸ Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Lesco Mfg. & Design Co., 736 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

²⁹ See McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978), on remand, 509 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 696 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1982); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. den., 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).

³⁰ University. of Detroit, 701 F. Supp. at 1341, rev'd. on other grounds, 904 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1990).

³¹ EEOC Dec. 6180 (1970). See also EEOC Dec. 6283 (1971) (where an employer could not fire employee for wearing traditional Islam garb because there was no evidence that requiring employees to wear traditional office attire was necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business).

³² Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995). However, the court in this case found that the employee's religious belief that she must wear a Pro-Life button depicting a fetus was reasonably accommodated when the employer offered to let the employee wear the button as long as it was covered, or let the employee wear a button with a similar message, but without the picture of the fetus.

³³ EEOC Dec. 6817 (1982). See also Bhatia v. Chevron USA, Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).

³⁴ See, e.g., Minnesota Dept. of Highways v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Rights, 11 EPD 10863 (1976).

³⁵ Smith v. Universal Services, 360 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. La. 1972) (Where the court dismissed the complaint of a Pentecostal Church member who claimed he was fired because while he worked he sang religious hymns, preached, and prophesied of disasters and the death of co-workers on the job. The court found that his inability to get along with other employees and poor work were the reasons plaintiff was fired, and not his religious speech). See also Gillard v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 32 FEP 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1983).

³⁶ EEOC Decision No. 91-1 (1991).

³⁷ See, e.g., Redmond, 574 F.2d at 901-2; Shaffeld v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv. Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 944 (M.D. Ala. 1974).

³⁸ Pyro Mining, 827 F.2d at 1086; Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1182 ("'undue hardship' must mean present undue hardship, as distinguished from anticipated or multiplied hardship" (emphasis in original)).

³⁹ Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978); Burns, 589 F.2d 403 at 406; Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated and remanded for reh'g, 403 U.S. 903 (1977).

⁴⁰ Pyro Mining, 827 F.2d at 1085-86 (quoting Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975)).

⁴¹ Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84; Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 736 F.2d at 1027.

⁴² Dixon v. Omaha Public Power District, 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974). See also United States v. City of Albuquerque, 423 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.M. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. den., 433 U.S. 909 (1977) (where accommodating fireman's Sabbath would have required other firefighters to work 38 hour shifts).

⁴³ Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).

⁴⁴ Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).

⁴⁵ Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).

⁴⁶ Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).

⁴⁷ 97 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996).

⁴⁸ Brown, 61 F.3d at 659.

⁴⁹ Id.

⁵⁰ Tucker, 97 F.3d at 1215.

⁵¹ Id.

⁵² Brown, 61 F.3d at 659.

⁵³ McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).

⁵⁴ Brown, 61 F.3d at 659. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 376 (1927) ( Brandeis, J. concurring)).

⁵⁵ Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace, August 22, 1997, available in, WESTLAW, 1997 WL 13652877.

⁵⁶ Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. den., 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996).

⁵⁷ E.E.O.C. v. Townley Engineering & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 621 (9th Cir. 1988).

⁵⁸ Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351, 362-63 (Or. 1995) (evangelical Christian employer did not violate state law prohibiting employers from "making religious advances" by witnessing to his employee and inviting him to church).

⁵⁹ Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1021.

⁶⁰ Taylor v. National Group of Co's., 729 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (employer's gift of a book endorsing secular humanism to new employees on their first day of work did not rise to the level of religious discrimination against a Christian employee).

⁶¹ Brown Transport Corp. v. Human Relations Com'n., 578 A.2d 555 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).

⁶² Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Assoc., 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).

⁶³ Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. den., 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996).

⁶⁴ Kolodziej v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 634 (Mass. 1992).

⁶⁵ Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1342 (6th Cir. 1983).

⁶⁶ Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976); Church of Scientology v. Director, FBI, 459 F. Supp. 748, 759 (D.C. DC 1978).

⁶⁷ 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1).

⁶⁸ Title VII time limits "are not jurisdictional." Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994). The limits are analogous to statutes of limitation and are subject to equitable modification. Id.; see also Rice v. New England College, 676 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1982). Equitable modifications were permitted where "a claimant has received inadequate notice; or where a motion for appointment of counsel is pending; or where the court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done everything required of her [or] affirmative misconduct on the part of a defendant." Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (citations omitted). In contrast, modification was not permitted where a pro se claimant argued the right-to-sue letter was ambiguous, Soto v. U.S. Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1990); the claimant misunderstood the right-to-sue letter and named the wrong defendant, Rys v. U.S. Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443 (1st Cir. 1989); or where the claimant filed claims well after the 180 day period despite sufficient knowledge of procedures and fora for administrative relief. Hamilton v. West, 30 F.3d 992, 993-94 (8th Cir. 1994).

⁶⁹ Id.

⁷⁰ 42 U.S.C. 2000e-(5)(d).

⁷¹ See Breen v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A., 865 F. Supp. 574, 578 (D.Minn. 1994) (complaint untimely when deferral agency did not cross-file complaint and plaintiff's counsel failed to monitor filings).

⁷² 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1).

⁷³ Id.

⁷⁴ Id.

⁷⁵ Id.

⁷⁶ 29 C.F.R. 1614.105(a)(1) (1996).

⁷⁷ 1614.105(a)(2)(d). This period is extended to 90 days if the agency has a "dispute resolution procedure" in place, 1614.105(a)(2)(f), or for up to 60 days if the aggrieved person so requests in writing. 1614.105(a)(2)(e).

⁷⁸ Id.

⁷⁹ 1614.108(f).

⁸⁰ 1614.408(b).

⁸¹ 1614.408(a).

⁸² 1614.402(a).

⁸³ 1614.406.

⁸⁴ 1614.408(d).