Excerpts From Supreme Court Opinions in Ten Commandments Cases

June 15, 2011

7 min read

10 Commandments

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On June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States decided two critically important cases involving the display of the Ten Commandments.  Both cases were decided by a deeply divided court with votes of 5-4.  In the Texas case (Van Orden v. Perry) the Justices upheld the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles displayed outside the state capitol some 40 years ago.  In the Kentucky case (McCreary County v. ACLU) the high court concluded that posting the Commandments inside a courthouse was unconstitutional.

Justice Stephen Breyer played a pivotal role in both cases.  He voted against the display in Kentucky and cast the deciding vote in the Texas case which will keep thousands of monuments in place across America.


Here are some excerpts from Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in the Texas case:

One must refer instead to the basic purpose of those [Religious] Clauses.  They seek too assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all.  They seek to maintain that separation of church and state that has long been critical to the peaceful dominion that religion exercises in this country, where the sprit of religion and the spirit of freedom are productively united, reign[ing] together but in separate spheres on the same soil.

Government must neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that it must effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion, and that it must work deterrence of no religious belief,

The government must avoid excessive interference with, or promotion of, religion.

But the Establishment Clause does not compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious.  Such absolutism is not only inconsistent with our national traditions, but would also tend to promote the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.

Neither can this Courts other tests readily explain the Establishment Clauses tolerance, for example, of the prayers that open legislative meetings; certain references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings; or the attention paid to the religious objectives of certain holidays, including Thanksgiving.

If the relation between government and religion is one of separation, but not of mutual hostility and suspicion, one will inevitably find difficult borderline cases.  And in such cases, I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.

While the Courts prior tests provide useful guideposts and might well lead to the same result the Court reaches todayno exact formula can dictate a resolution to such factintensive cases

The case before us is a borderline case.

"In certain contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten Commandments can convey not simply a religious message but also a secular message (about proper standards of social conduct).  And in certain contexts, a display of the tablets can also convey a historical message (about a historic relation between those standards and the law)"

Here the tablets have been used as part of a display that communicates not simply a religious message, but a secular message as well.  The circumstances surrounding the displays placement on the capitol grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State itself intended the latter, nonreligious aspects of the tablets message to predominate.

The group that donated the monument, the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a private civic (and primarily secular organization), while interested in the religious aspect of the Ten Commandments, sought to highlight the Commandments role in shaping civic morality as part of that organizations efforts to combat juvenile delinquency.

The tablets, as displayed on the monument, prominently acknowledge that the eagles donated the display, a factor which, though not sufficient, thereby further distances the State itself from the religious aspect of the Commandments message.

It (together with the displays inscription about its origin) communicates to visitors that the state sought to reflect moral principles, illustrating a relation between ethics and law that the States citizens, historically speaking, have endorsed.

As far as I can tell, 40 years passed in which the presence of this monument, legally speaking, went unchallenged.

Those 40 years suggest that the public visiting the capitol grounds has considered the religious aspect of the tablets message as part of what is a broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage.

For these reasons, I believe that the Texas display serving a mixed but primarily non religious purpose, not primarily advanc[ing] or inhibit[ing] religion and not creating an excessive government entanglement with religion,might satisfy this Courts more formal Establishment Clause tests. 

At the same time, to reach a contrary conclusion here, based primarily upon the religious nature of the tablets text would, I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions.  Such a holding might well encourage disputes concerning the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings across the Nation.  And it could thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.


Justice Antonin Scalia issued a stinging dissent in the Kentucky case.  Here are excerpts from that opinion:

Nor have the views of our people on this matter significantly changed.  Presidents continue to conclude the Presidential oath with the words 'so help me God.' Our legislatures, state and national, continue to open their sessions with prayer led by official chaplains.  The sessions of this court continue to open with the prayer God Save the United States and this Honorable Court.  Invocation of the Almighty by our public figures, at all levels of government remains commonplace.  Our coinage bears the motto IN GOD WE TRUST and our Pledge of Allegiance contains the acknowledgment that we are a Nation Under God.  As one of our Supreme Court opinions rightly observed, 'We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being'"

A model spread across Europe by the armies of Napoleon, and reflected in the Constitution of France, which begins 'France is [a]secularRepublic.'  Religion is to be strictly excluded from the public forum.  This is not, and never was, the model adopted by America.  George Washington added to the form of Presidential oath prescribed by Art, II sec. 1, cl. 8 of the Constitution, the concluding words so help me God.

The same week that Congress submitted the Establishment Clause as part of the Bill of Rights for ratification by the States, it enacted legislation providing for paid chaplains in the House and Senate.

Those who wrote the Constitution believed that morality was essential to the well-being of society and that encouragement of religion was the best way to foster morality.

With all of this reality (and much more) staring it in the face, how can the Court possibly assert that the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and non religion.

Todays opinion forthrightly (or actually, somewhat less than forthrightly) admits that it does not rest upon consistently applied principle.

If religion in the public forum had to be entirely nondenominational, there could be no religion in the public forum at all.  If the opinions of the Supreme Court were consistent in its neutrality between religion and non religion, One cannot say the word God, or the Almighty, one cannot offer public supplication or thanksgiving, without contradicting the beliefs of some people that there are many gods, or that God or the gods pay no attention to human affairs.